The advance of measurement in human thought
Measurement is a basic instrument of modern thought. We use it to describe the world, to reason about it, and to manage it. We seek strength in numbers. Our culture has, to a large extent adopted the programme, which Galileo laid down for the physical sciences: "Count what is countable, measure what is measurable and make measurable that which is not".
Technologists should view this with pride. We have always known that everything in our world that is not untouched nature is the product of technology. Now, to an increasing extent, technological approaches are leading to wider knowledge, understanding and wisdom.
Applications of measurement
Measurement was born at the dawn of material civilisation. It arose in ancient times in Mesopotamia, Egypt, India and China as an essential tool of crafts, trade, surveying and calendar establishment. It made the building of ancient cultures possible. It became the essential enabling tool of technology. Above all, its application led to a revolution in our understanding of the world. Measurement made possible the development of natural science that transformed human thought. With the model of natural science as a guide, measurement has now pervaded all domains of human a airs.
Technologists frequently complain, sometimes seriously, that their world is governed by accountants. They believe accountancy to be a somewhat alien craft. It is in fact the application of measurement to the description of enterprises. Its di culties are di culties of nding appropriate measures and of modelling of complex systems.
What is true of individual enterprises is true of the larger economies. They can only be described and understood through models based on measurement. The measurement of economic variables is an essential enterprise. The assurance that the measures are appropriate and truthful is a matter of great practical concern. The nding of appropriate economic measures, the performance of the measurements and the building and analysis of models of economies are all di cult problems, but their solutions are assiduously pursued.
The description and understanding of human societies also increasingly relies on measurement. Sociologists measure poverty, attitudes, social distance, political behaviour, con icts and the like. They endeavour to nd measures of attributes of societies and their functioning. They sometimes endeavour to build models.
While, since its origins, the object of technology has been the use of the forces and resources of nature for the use and convenience of humanity, we have now become aware that the growth generated is exhausting those resources and having a threatening impact on our environment. We face climate change, loss of the rich diversity of plant and animal life and exhaustion of sources of energy and materials. The threat is being detected by measurement of climate, of ecological variables and the like. There is debate about how to tackle the challenges. One thing is certain; the debate is all based on measurement and on models based on it.
We use measurement to understand ourselves. Psychological applications have been among the earliest outside the physical sciences. We endeavour to measure intelligence, perceptions, sensations and emotions. We use tests and measurement very extensively in education.
The progress of modern medicine is spearheaded by diagnostic methods based on measurement. The applications of measurement extend beyond physical and chemical variables. There are being developed such indices as quality-adjusted-life-years and state-ofhealth measures to guide medical thought and decision-making.
The list is super cial and scarcely exhaustive. It merely indicates the wide range and pervasiveness of the applications of measurement. In many domains the problems of development of appropriate measures and of performing measurement are not adequately solved. They constitute a research agenda rather than an established methodology. However, the list makes clear the signi cance of measurement in the modern world.
Foundations of Measurement
The wide applications of measurement are driven by the success of the natural sciences in describing and explaining the world.
Measurement in these sciences is so well established that it is not generally important to consider the de nition and logical foundations of the process. To adapt the well-known aphorism: natural scientists and technologists need the philosophy of measurement like birds need ornithology. However, in many domains of knowledge measurements and their validity are not soundly based. The requirements to undertake measurement in such domains have led to the development of a rigorous theory and philosophy of measurement.
Modern foundations of measurement are based on the model theory of logic. It is not proposed to outline it here, because the abstract and formal nature of the theory would be out of place. It is nevertheless necessary to discuss the foundations of measurement brie y and without formality.
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The paper looks at measurement as a basic tool of modern thought, with wide applications. It presents an informal overview of the fundamental principles of measurement and examines some of its general problems. It concludes that measurement and control technology has much to contribute to wider applications of measurement and much to learn from them.
What measurement is
The requirements of wide applications of measurement demand the adoption of a general and inclusive concept of measurement.
Measurement is, in the wide sense, an objective, empirical process of establishing a correspondence between properties of objects and events of the real world and a set of symbols and relations. The correspondence is such, that when a symbol is assigned to a manifestation of the property and another symbol is assigned to another manifestation of the same property, then the relation between the two symbols corresponds to a relation between the two manifestations of the property.
This de nition of measurement is not accepted by all. Many, in particular natural scientists and technologists, restrict the term measurement to representations by number. Moreover, they require that the representative number system should have relations of equality, order and an operation of addition de ned on it. In this, strictly or strongly, de ned measurement, a number corresponding to a manifestation of a property represents the number of times that quantity is greater than that de ned as a unit.
Such strongly de ned measurement scales cannot be found for many properties outside the physical sciences that we may wish to describe. For these measurands we may need to use measurement de ned in the weak sense. Such description is measurement in the wide sense, but the symbolic representational system may be other than numerical, and the relations de ned on it more restricted. They may be limited to an equivalence relation or to an order only. Such weakly de ned measurement includes objective empirical classications, and symbolic representations that represent an ordering of the measurands.
The properties of descriptions by measurement
It is proposed now to consider some of the properties of description by measurement that give it special strength.
Objectivity
By de nition, measurement provides objective descriptions. That is, measurements yield descriptions that are, within a limit of uncertainty, independent of the observer. In any reasoning descriptions by measurements have a xed and veri able meaning. A xed meaning of terms is a requirement of rational discourse. Hence it is sound to claim that descriptions by measurement are the securest basis for valid reasoning.
While in the natural sciences objectivity does not, generally, present fundamental di culties, it is a signi cant problem in many applications of measurement. In the social sciences, in particular, there are opinions that objectivity is not attainable. Those formulating theories, performing tests and interpreting them are in uenced and limited by their particular culture and language, by the society in which they work, by interests, by gender, and the like. In other applications independence from subjective judgement of the observer is important to achieve.
Empirical basis
Measurement is an empirical process. This means rstly that the process of measuring is one of observation and not theory or speculation. Further, the relations between quality manifestations on which scales of measurement are based must be empirically observable relations and not postulated by a theory.
For example, scienti c names assigned to animals in the zoological classi cation system, such as Felis silvestris catus, for domestic cat, is assigned by empirical observations. Further the relation between one species and another, such as that between a domestic cat and a lion Panthera leo, is again based on empirical observations. Such a classi cation is measurement in the wide sense.
There are a number classi cation schemes for the purpose of acquiring, organising and presenting information on industrial and economic activities. The schemes assign numerical symbols to industrial and business sectors. The assignment is objective, that is independent of the classi er provided the rules of the scheme are followed. The classi cation is based on empirical evidence. The relations between the numerical symbols represent relations between the sectors. The scheme has therefore many characteristics of measurement. However, the relations between the sectors are not empirically determinable, but rather are based on theoretical considerations. Thus the numerical symbols are not measures.
Standards and traceability
Measurement must be based on a standard that is xed and veri able. Any measurement, to be valid, must be traceable to the standard. In the natural sciences and technology there is an e ective organisation to ensure it. In trade and like applications the maintenance and dissemination of standards has always been recognised as a vital task.
Problems arise in the wider applications of measurement. For example, in economics many measurements are expressed in money units. These are not of constant value and it is necessary to adjust measurements for in ation, varying exchange rates and the like.
Perhaps a major concern is in educational measurement of attainment. It is di cult to ensure that the standards that are used remain constant and they are rarely veri ed.
Uncertainty
Any measurement involves uncertainty. There is always an uncertainty associated with a standard and with the process by which a particular measurement has been carried out.
Essentially without a clear statement of the uncertainty associated with a measurement, the measurement is not valid. Nevertheless many measurements are stated without statements of associated uncertainty. This is true, in particular, in educational measurements. If an examination result is treated as a measure of attainment we must recognise that there is a degree of uncertainty associated with it, but we do not have methods, or indeed general concepts for its evaluation.
Making measurable that which is not
To develop a scale of measurement for a hitherto unmeasurable quality it is necessary rst to establish a concept of what is to be measured. We develop it by observation of the real world. We examine people and note that they manifest di erent capabilities, we observe the behaviour of people and notice their relatively stable likes and dislikes, we smell substances and sense di erent odours, we experience feelings such as pain. We note relations among these manifestations such as identity and di erence; we may be able to place them in an order of perceived magnitude and so on. We thus form concepts of intelligence, attitude, odour, pain and the like.
Measurement is the objective symbolic description based on those concepts.
In the wider applications of measurement the problem of the concept of the measurand o ers signi cant problems. We have well standardised intelligence tests and a well established measure of an intelligence quotient. However, there is much dispute as to what intelligence is. In educational measurement there is often little clarity about what examinations purport to measure and what they actually measure.
We can thus see that there is a di culty in the measurement of such qualities as beauty. The existence and meaningful use of the word beauty indicates the usefulness of the concept. However, there is not an objective rule for classifying some aspect of observable objects as manifestations of beauty. Similarly, there are no objective empirical relations such as indistinguishability or precedence, in respect of beauty. The basis for measurement of beauty is thus absent from the outset.
There are at present intensive researches into the measurement of emotions. The measurement processes sought are likely to be based on such correlates of emotions as physiological phenomena. When scales of measurement are established it will be necessary to test their validity, that is to establish whether the relations between measures of manifestations correspond to the relations between the manifestations as de ned by the measurand concept.
Reasoning with numbers
Description of individual properties of objects or events of the real world is not, generally, the end object of measurement. We use the measurements to reason about what has been measured, to build mathematical models of portions of the world and to interpret them.
In measurement in the strong sense in the natural sciences the measures are numerical and we can use them in the language of mathematics. Further in the physical sciences there are well established and validated theories relating the measurands, providing the foundation for model building and analysis.
In the wider applications of measurement problems often arise. One is the meaningfulness of statements made in terms of symbols that are not numbers. Where measurements represent only an order relation, like for instance in IQs, averages are not meaningful, since there is no empirical meaning to the additions of two manifestations of intelligence. Appropriate measures of central tendency are such measures as mode. Measures of dispersion are best given in terms of, say, interquartile range
The value of a descriptive quantity in the wider applications of measurement depends on whether it is related to other variables. Thus measurements of intelligence are only valuable if they are relatable to other variables in a model with explanatory or predictive power.
Measures of complex attributes
Some measurands cannot be describe by a single number or symbol. To take a simple example from the physical sciences, it takes three numbers to describe a force.
In the wider application of measurement such measurands are common. In educational measurement of attainment, attainment has multiple aspects or dimensions each of which has a separate measure. Educational attainment is best expressed as an array of measures. This is true of a whole range of measurands such as managerial performance, or product quality.
There is usually, however, a desire to produce a concise single number description. Common ways of arriving at such single number descriptions of multi-dimensional measures involves such methods as calculating weighted averages of the measures of the individual dimensions of the attribute. It is to be remembered that such summative numerical descriptions are based on theoretical assumptions and are thus not really satisfactory measurements.
Measurements on complex systems
Measurements are very often required to be performed on intact functioning systems. The standard approach to such measurements is to apply a stimulus to the system and to observe the system response, estimating variables and parameters of the system from the stimulus-response relation. We generally require a theoretical model of the system to perform the estimation.
One of the signi cant problems in the wider applications of measurement is the fact that in many classes of measurement experiments are impossible and observations on an undisturbed system are the only way to obtain information. Thus in economic and social systems measurement it is not possible to disturb the economy or society for experimental purposes. The same applies to measurements of the environment. Similarly, in medical measurements it is not ethical apply a signi cant stimulus to a person, without therapeutic purpose In many of the above examples it is not possible to formulate a model of the system under observation to provide a basis of measurement. There is commonly insu cient a priori knowledge to enable models to be built. Also the systems tend to be large and complex, presenting di culties of description and modelling. Many of the processes are commonly non-linear and they may behave chaotically. Above all, systems may not behave according to regular laws.
The problems are particularly evident in systems incorporating humans. Human actors are intelligent and may be aware they are being observed. The system may thus respond di erently to the same stimulus under the same conditions.
Objections to measurement
Measurement and the scienti c method have been evidently successful in the natural sciences and in technology. However, there are signi cant objections to the application of this approach to economic, social and psychological domains. The objections are many and various. They can be presented here only in outline.
There is a view that there can be no scienti c laws of human behaviour and hence the study of humans and their behaviour using the concepts and methods of natural science is inappropriate. The objections are fundamental. Human actions and events are each unique and not subject to regularities. We cannot objectively determine what is in the mind of others. The proper study of human events and a airs is by empathetic understanding. This is to be gained by studies of the humanities such as literature and history. While there is merit in this view, it fails to account for the signi cant descriptive and explanatory power that measurement has brought to the social and psychological domains of knowledge.
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The strongest objections are those concerning the impossibility of objectivity. They have already been touched upon. There are many strong voices that maintain objectivity and value-freedom are unattainable and that bias shapes the views of scienti c investigators. Students of the history and sociology of knowledge have signi cantly challenged the objectivity and rationality of natural science. These challenges point to signi cant problems. However, measurement, when soundly performed, makes assumptions underlying it explicit, transparent and subject to veri cation or refutation. Subjective judgments are often of the kind: "My mind is made up, do not confuse me with facts".
There are views that application of measurement to human thoughts, emotions and actions is unethical. It treats humans as objects without respecting their humanity. In response one may assert that objective knowledge based on measurement is in itself always ethical and worth striving for. However, any action taken on the basis of such knowledge must be taken with respect to moral principles.
Finally, one must recognise the popular suspicion of numbers used in political argument. The saying that there are lies, damn lies and statistics has wide currency. It is true that many of those using gures in argument, use it like a drunk uses a lamppost, for support rather than illumination. However, while scepticism is soundly based, rejection of measurement is not. We should always be able to check the validity of any measurements and reject the data if they are unsound. The problem is usually not the gures, but their interpretation. As has been argued, measurement-based data provide a sound basis for reasoning validly about the world and for challenging wrong arguments.
In conclusion
Measurement is a tool of great power and universal application. It is based on sound generic principles.
The wide applications of measurement are not wholly developed. They are rather work in progress and an agenda for action.
Measurement technologists will recognise many of the outstanding problems as ones they face in their own discipline. They have much to bene t from lifting their eyes to wider problems of measurement. Above all they have much to contribute.
Introduction
Two ABB 'PFMaster' solids ow meters were tested on the University of Teesside's pneumatic conveying test rig. The air-solids ratio was varied over the full operating range of the rig and results were obtained from both meters, one of which was in a vertical section and the other in a horizontal section. The material used in the tests was Fillite, a form of pulverised fuel (PF) ash, to simulate pulverised coal. E ects of variation of conveying particles of di erent sizes are also reported
Meter Description
The meters used in the power generation industry are in two di erent con gurations shown in Fig. 1 . The 'wafer meter' is usually bolted between anges into a permanent location and gives an indication of pulverised coal velocity and solids mass ow rate, whereas the smaller ' at faced' sensor is usually tted with its front surface ush with the inner pipe wall of large conveyors, sometimes at the mill output, to monitor PF velocity but it can be used to give indications of undesirable ow properties such as 'roping' . In the tests described, two circular 40mm diameter meters were tted into the university pneumatic conveyor. A photograph of this test rig showing the two meters in situ is shown in Fig. 2. 
